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Abstract 
When analysing coalition agreements, scholars mostly concentrate on those agreements that are 
written at the national level. However, there is also a considerable amount of coalition agreements 
that are written at sub-national levels. This paper analyses the commonalities and differences in 
coalition agreements in the German multi-level system at the national, regional and local level. 
From a legal jurisdiction perspective, one would expect that there are major differences across 
political levels in the topics covered in the agreements. From a multi-level governance perspective, 
however, one would additionally expect that government parties also devote their attention to 
policy domains that lie outside their realm of legislative decision-making. We take Germany as a 
prime example for a political system characterized by joint decision-making authorities within 
cooperative federalism. Combining data from the Political Documents Archive (www.polidoc.net) 
with newly data from the Local Manifesto Project (LMP; www.localpartymanifestos.de), we analyse 
nearly 200 coalition agreements at the national, regional and local level in Germany by applying 
quantitative text analysis techniques. The empirical results show that governing parties mostly talk 
about the policy areas they are legally responsible for. However, particularly local and regional 
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1. Introduction  
 
Most political parties do not only compete at one single political level but rather in ‘multiple 
electoral arenas’ (Golder et al., 2017, 2) within multi-level governance systems (Deschouwer, 2003; 
van Houten, 2009). Be it at the national and European level (e.g. Braun and Schmitt, forthcoming), 
at the national and regional level (e.g. Cabeza, Gómez and Alonso, 2017; Müller, 2013) or even at 
the regional and European level (e.g. Schakel, 2018), parties simultaneously engage in political 
competition at different layers of multi-level governance systems. Yet, party signalling to voters 
via position-taking and issue emphasis in election manifestos and campaign strategies does not end 
with the respective elections. Particularly parties in government have the option to send specific 
policy signals to voters and especially to their partisan supporters via an additional option: written 
coalition agreements. 
 
So far, the comprehensiveness and general issue areas of coalition agreements mainly have been 
investigated at the national level (e.g. Eichorst, 2014; Indridason and Kristinsson, 2013; Müller, 
Bergman and Strøm, 2010; Timmermans, 2006). Yet, there is a lack of studies specifically focusing 
on the topic coverage of coalition agreements on different political layers of a multi-level 
governance system. When drafting coalition agreements, parties at the national level have at least 
two options for the way in which they include topics and issues. First, parties most likely will strive 
for the inclusion of topics that are salient for their voters and party members. Secondly, parties 
need to react to the political and economic environment they are bargaining in. This means that 
they should also include topics of high relevance for the public at the time of writing the coalition 
agreement, even if these topics are not the primary concern of the parties. Yet, things get more 
complicated in multi-level systems where governing parties at the sub-national level also draw 
coalition agreements and where national, regional and local actors are participating in central 
political decisions due to their joint decision-making authorities. It remains an open question to 
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what extent parties restrict themselves to the coverage of topics that they are legally in charge of. 
Therefore, this contribution is interested in answering the following research question: Which topics 
do governing parties cover in their coalition agreements in multi-level settings? 
 
To answer this question, we take the multi-level setting of Germany as an illustrative case because, 
on the one hand, it is characterized by a rather clear structure with regard to the legal competences 
of the different political levels, at least in some policy domains. On the other hand, German politics 
is also shaped by joint decision-making authorities between national and regional political actors, 
as well as mutual interrelations between the national, regional and local level regarding execution 
competences which may have adverse effects on dual accountability and citizens’ possibilities to 
attribute responsibility for governmental behaviour. By using 190 coalition agreements from the 
national, regional and local level, we demonstrate which topics are covered by government parties 
in their coalition agreements.1 The empirical findings show that governing parties mostly talk about 
the policy areas they are legally responsible for. However, particularly local and regional governing 
parties also address policy areas that do not lie in the realm of their jurisdiction. 
 
In the following section, we discuss coalition agreements in multi-level systems in general. In 
section three, we elaborate on our theoretical expectations regarding parties’ topic coverage in 
coalition agreements in the German multi-level system. We present our data and how we measure 
topic coverage in coalition agreements in the fourth section. Section five presents the results of 
the empirical analysis. In the last section, we discuss parties’ topic coverage in coalition agreements 
in detail and elaborate on ways for further research. 
 
2. Coalition agreements in multi-level settings 
                                                          
1 In contrast to other authors (see e.g. Klüver and Bäck, forthcoming) we are not interested in the outcome of coalition 
negotiations (i.e. the influence of coalition parties on the content of the coalition agreement) but rather in the 
distribution of attention towards certain topics in the coalition agreement. 
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While single-party governments are (more or less) free to act during their time in office, parties in 
coalition governments must coordinate and compromise with their coalition partners.2 Even 
though all governments are confronted with delegation problems, they are more severe in coalition 
governments. For instance, coalition governments delegate tasks to ministers that are then 
expected to pursue the agreed policies. Since ministers enjoy informational and expertise 
advantages vis-à-vis other cabinet members (Laver and Shepsle, 1996), ministers can shirk from the 
agreed policies. They might even be motivated to do so to please their own party members as they 
are highly dependent on them for re-election (Müller and Meyer, 2010). 
 
To constrain the shirking of ministers, coalition governments can make use of control mechanisms 
such as coalition agreements. Coalition agreements are defined as ‘the most binding, written 
statements to which the parties of a coalition commit themselves, that is, the most authoritative 
document that constrains party behavior’ (Müller and Strøm, 2010, 170, emphasis in original). 
They serve several purposes. First, governing parties use coalition agreements to lower the risk of 
early government termination by establishing control mechanisms to keep tabs on coalition 
partners and to manage intra-coalitional conflicts (Bowler et al., 2016; Indridason and Kristinsson, 
2013; Krauss, 2018). Secondly, coalition agreements can be conceived as policy signals to 
governing parties’ rank-and-file members. Thirdly, governing parties highlight their primary policy 
goals and try to signal to voters that they intend to keep their electoral promises (for an overview, 
see Eichorst, 2014). Although the content of coalition agreements is usually divided into three 
categories—policies, procedural rules and portfolio allocation—coalition parties mainly 
                                                          
2 Coalition governments in parliamentary democracies are prone to less transparent politics for voters because it is 
more likely than in single-party governments that negotiations within the coalition or between government parties 
are privately and internally (Strøm, 2000, 281), and thus cannot enter voters’ considerations on election day (León, 
2018, 707). Coalition agreements are one way to counter this lack of transparency since government parties publicly 
commit themselves to jointly agreed policy proposals. 
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concentrate on policies when writing their coalition agreements (Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 
2010). 
 
For the national level, there exists a large literature on the comprehensiveness of and the general 
issue areas covered in coalition agreements (see, e.g Eichorst, 2014; Indridason and Kristinsson, 
2013; Müller, Bergman and Strøm, 2010; Timmermans, 2006) while coalition agreements at the 
regional and local level only attracted little scholarly attention (for an exception see Baumann, 
Debus and Gross, 2017; Gross 2016, 2017, 2018; Stefuric 2009) The content of coalition 
agreements at the sub-national level, however, and its comparability to coalition agreements at the 
national level have not been scrutinized so far. This is surprising since there is a considerable 
amount of coalition agreements that are written at sub-national levels in countries with multi-level 
governance structures. Such political systems are characterized by joint decision-making, where 
national, regional and/or local actors are participating in central political decisions, and they are 
quite common in West European democracies (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, or The Netherlands).3 
Secondly, multi-level settings are sometimes criticized for hampering dual accountability due to 
joint decision-making authorities, blurring the clarity of (institutional) responsibility and affecting 
citizens’ representation in the political process. The role coalition agreements at different political 
levels might play has not been studied so far.  
 
Particularly joint decision-making authorities partially run counter to the ‘clarity of responsibility’ 
(Powell and Whitten, 1993). Most of the literature on clarity of responsibility deals with the link 
between citizens’ economic voting and the clarity of institutional settings in multi-level systems 
and empirically shows that complex institutional settings have adverse effects on the 
                                                          
3 In some countries, for example in our illustrative example of the German multi-level governance system (see below), 
the local level does not have a say in policy-making at the national and state level; yet, the local level often has large 
execution competences, i.e. in some policy areas it is local political actors’ decision to what extent and in which way 
they execute national and state laws, respectively. 
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straightforward connection between concrete policies and voters’ evaluations of these policies, 
whereas the mere existence of coalition governments and coalition agreements negatively affects 
the clarity of responsibility (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013). 
 
From a retrospective voting perspective, it is expected that voters incorporate a government’s 
performance evaluation into their voting decision. Government parties should therefore restrain 
from including pledges in their coalition agreements which they cannot fulfil due to the lack of 
legislative competences. Additionally, from a democratic theory perspective specifically focusing 
on multi-level governance systems, one would ideally expect that voters will hold politicians 
accountable for things the respective politicians actually can control (Rodden and Wibbels, 2010, 
630). This dual accountability can most likely be achieved if the various levels of government have 
‘mutually exclusive spheres of authority’, so that voters have the best chances to ‘assign 
responsibility to the appropriate level of government’ (Rodden and Wibbels, 2010, 632). 
Empirically, however, this ‘dual accountability does not seem to operate very clearly’ (Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2010, 631), not even in decentralized governance systems where government 
competences are clearly separated across the different political levels (for an overview, see 
Thorlakson, 2017, 548). Taking the example of decentralized and federalized political systems, 
voters face problems in clearly assigning responsibilities to the various governments at different 
political levels because (i) sub-national levels might primarily only be in charge of implementing 
federal legislation, but at the same time the multi-level nature of the political system requires a 
minimum of coordination between the different political levels (Thorlakson, 2017); (ii) the number 
of veto players in federal and decentralized systems, particularly in countries with second 
chambers, might distort citizens’ views on politicians’ authorities over specific policy fields (León, 
2018); (iii) politicians might play credit claiming and blame shifting in policy areas where several 
political levels have joint authority (Volden, 2005); and (iv) power allocation to different tiers of 
government is not clear-cut in many policy areas (Toubeau and Wagner, 2018). Additionally, one 
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might add that voters focus more on federal policies (Stecker, 2015, 1309) and have the tendency 
to hold regional political actors accountable for policies that are not dealt with at the regional level 
(see, e.g. ; Toubeau and Wagner, 2018). This is particularly the case when distributed powers 
between political levels are intertwined (León, 2010).  
 
Regarding coalition agreements in multi-level settings, political actors thus should have an 
incentive to rather focus on issues, topics and policies that lie in their realm of decision-making to 
get voters’ credit if they fulfil their pledges. In line with the responsible party model (APSA, 1950), 
government parties should translate voters’ policy preferences into government. However, this 
does not only depend on a party’s ability to enter the government, but also on the parties’ ability 
to pursue their policy plans within their institutional capabilities. For instance, there are policies 
that can only be changed at the European level. Countries that are members of the European 
Union are not allowed to sign trade agreements with other countries single-handedly. Similar 
arrangements can be found within the nation state. Therefore, the distribution of competences 
might have an influence on what is actually written down in coalition agreements. While parties 
will try to listen to their voters, they will also try to avoid including promises they cannot fulfil due 
to lacking competences. This reasoning is in line with the literature on pledge fulfilment showing 
that coalition agreements are one of the main explanatory variables for pledge fulfilment because 
if a pledge had been translated into the coalition agreement, the chances of fulfilment are 
substantially higher (see e.g. Moury, 2011; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014a, b). 
 
Yet, the literature on pledge fulfilment exclusively focuses on the politics and policies at the 
national level. Arguing from a multi-level governance perspective, however, it might additionally 
be the case that coalition partners at one political level exclusively include topics that can only be 
fulfilled at another political level just because these coalition partners also coalesce at this other 
political level. For example, including national policies in sub-national coalition agreements could 
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be a signal of government parties to their core partisan supporters and voters that they will make 
use of their possibilities to influence national politics via joint decision-making and within a second 
chamber. Furthermore, in situations where sub-national elections are perceived by voters as 
second-order elections to judge national politics by focusing on national issues, sub-national 
parties might not only anticipate this and adjust their election campaigns (Däubler, Müller and 
Stecker, 2018; Stecker, 2015). Sub-national political actors drafting a coalition agreement might 
additionally have a clear incentive to also address national issues in their written agreements in 
order to show to voters that political actors take their concerns seriously.4 Hence we would expect 
to see that national, regional and local coalition agreements also cover topics that are not primarily 
in their realm of legislative decision-making. 
 
3. Which topics should parties cover in their coalition agreements in Germany? 
 
Different political levels in multi-level governance systems have different legal competences over 
specific policy fields. These legal competences might be clearly separated, i.e. that only one political 
layer is legally responsible for legislating specific policy fields or characterized by joint decision-
making between several political layers. In Germany, most legislative powers are concentrated at 
the federal level. Although states are almost exclusively responsible for education policy regarding 
the school system, cultural policy, police and media, they must share decision-making authorities 
in the most important policy fields, such as taxation, social policy or labour policy, with the federal 
level (Stecker, 2015, 1308). Local governments are administrative institutions, yet local councils do 
adopt statutes or propositions that are comparable to laws on the national and regional level (Gross 
and Debus, 2018, 68). Even though some policy domains are exclusively legislated by the federal 
                                                          
4 Additionally, particularly the local level in many European democracies is characterized by an interplay between local 
council majorities and directly elected mayors. Since mayors are the most prominent figure in local politics, thus 
resembling presidents in (semi-)presidential systems (cf. Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Oktay, 2018; Valdini and 
Lewis-Beck, 2018), ‘clarity of responsibility’ and pledge fulfilment might be more dependent on the performance of 
the mayor and less on local government parties’ performance and promised policies in their coalition agreements. 
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level in Germany, the German Länder implement most of the federal laws and regional 
governments’ policies nevertheless vary to a large degree (Jeffery et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
particularly the last reforms of German federalism increased joint decision-making between the 
federal and the state level (Benz and Sonnicksen, 2017; Kropp and Behnke, 2016), which gives 
regional governments still considerable leeway in policy-making. This clearly impacts sub-national 
parties’ campaign strategies, position-taking, and parliamentary behaviour (see, e.g. Müller, 2009, 
2013; Schröder and Stecker, 2018). In other words, ‘[w]hereas the policy agenda of the main sub-
national parties is nearly as all-embracing as that of their federal party organisation, the German 
version of federalism centralises most legislative competences at the national level and sets 
restrictive limits to the implementation of this policy agenda at the regional level’ (Stecker, 2015, 
1306). This means that although regional party branches have restricted legal leeway in 
implementing their preferred policies in many policy areas, they still ‘have an all-embracing agenda’ 
(Stecker, 2015, 1310). 
 
Independently from the empirical fact to what extent federal legislation is not in line with regional 
party branches’ policy preferences, regional party branches should have an incentive to talk about 
federal policies and national topics in their regional election manifestos and, consequently, as 
regional government parties in their coalition agreements. If sub-national government parties are 
not satisfied with policies pursuit by the federal organizations, sub-national government parties 
have the possibility to signal their diverging policy preferences to their regional or local voters in 
their election manifestos and coalition agreements (Stecker, 2015, 1306). For the case of Germany, 
it is a well-documented fact that sub-national parties adopt policy positions in their election 
manifestos that deviate to some degree from their federal parties’ positions (see Debus and Gross, 
2016; Müller, 2009, 2013). Furthermore, the policy locations of and included topics in coalition 
agreements in the German multi-level system differ between different compositions of (coalition) 
10 
governments, both at the state and the local level (see, e.g. Bowler et al., 2016; Gross, 2016). This 
indicates that sub-national government parties do try to pursuit different policies. 
 
Yet, due to the great extent of joint decision-making authorities in the multi-level system of 
Germany because of the concurrent legislation by the federal and state level and the fact that 
‘policy issues often transcend the territorial boarders of Länder jurisdictions’ (Kropp and Behnke, 
2016, 675), the state and local administrations’ role as executing authority for implementing these 
laws (Benz and Zimmer, 2011), and the federal-state nexus regarding shared taxes (Benz and 
Sonnicksen, 2017), we also expect that both national and regional, as well as local coalition 
agreements to some extent also address policy fields that are not in their exclusive realm of policy-
making. There are at least four reasons to expect this. First, even though sub-national party 
branches might be very clear and consistent in their policy messages by just focusing on a specific 
set of sub-national policies (Däubler, Müller and Stecker, 2018), sub-national party branches might 
also highlight national topics that are of utmost importance at the time of writing of the coalition 
agreements (for instance, how to deal with an economic crisis or an influx of migrants). Secondly, 
because German voters primarily care about federal policies, ‘sub-national parties in Germany and 
their leaders are incentivised to centre competition for regional votes around federal issues’ 
(Stecker, 2015, 1309), and this should also be reflected in regional coalition agreements. Thirdly, 
according to Article 50 German Basic Law the German Länder are involved in federal and 
European legal matters and administration, and regional government parties might use the content 
of their regional coalition agreements to show the federal government that they are not willing to 
allow it to limit states’ autonomous legislative responsibilities in those policy areas, where the 
consent of the German Länder is necessary to pass a law. Fourthly, German states do not only have 
independent legal competences, state and particularly local administrations often are in charge of 
implementing federal policies at the state and local level. Since citizens are directly impacted by 
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administrative decisions, regional and local political actors have an incentive to address such issues 
in regional and local coalition agreements. 
 
To sum up, we first expect that parties drafting coalition agreements at the federal level should 
primarily talk about policy fields where the federal level has exclusive legal competences (according 
to article 73 German Basic Law), and where international and supranational issues are affected. 
For example, the federal level should include more regulations about international affairs in their 
coalition agreements as they are solely responsible for these topics. Secondly, regional government 
parties should highlight in state coalition agreements particularly policy fields where they have 
exclusive decision-making authorities. Following from this, we posit two general hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The more legislative competences the levels have regarding specific policy domains, 
the more political actors emphasise these topics in the respective coalition agreements. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the level of joint decision-making between the federal and the state level 
is, the more balanced is political actors’ attention towards these topics in national and regional 
coalition agreements. 
 
Turning to the local level, Article 28 (2) German Basic Law states that local governments are 
responsible for settling all the affairs of the community as their own responsibility within the 
framework of the law. Yet, local political actors are not represented in some sort of ‘second or 
third chamber’, where they could negotiate with national and state political actors, respectively. 
Rather, local municipalities are part of state governments which represent municipalities in 
intergovernmental negotiations with the national government, and the federal government is not 
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allowed to lead direct negotiations with municipalities.5 Hence, in purely formal terms, ‘local 
governments are administrative institutions’ (Benz and Zimmer, 2011, 160). and regarding the de 
jure non-existing legal competencies of German municipalities, we would expect local government 
parties to talk extensively about local issues and only marginally about national and state policies 
in local coalition agreements. 
 
De facto, however, we argue that also local government parties should emphasise policy domains 
that are (more or less) exclusively related to the federal and state level (if we would strictly follow 
the provisions of the German Basic Law) because local political actors are in charge of executing 
many federal and state laws, on the one hand, and municipalities additionally have their own policy-
making authorities when levying local taxes, fees and charges, on the other hand (see e.g. the 
ideologically-induced variation in same-sex unions’ registration fees (Debus et al., 2013)). 
Therefore, the local level fulfils ‘important political functions for multi-level policy-making in the 
federal system’ (Benz and Zimmer, 2011, 160), and ‘German local governments have considerable 
leeway in deciding on their issues’ (Benz and Zimmer, 2011, 161).6 Consequently, our third 
hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the execution competence at the local level regarding specific policy 
domains, the more political actors emphasise these topics in local coalition agreements. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical expectations regarding the extent of government parties’ 
emphasis of different policy domains in their coalition agreements at the federal, state and local 
level (for the selection of the policy domains see the following section ‘Data and measurement’). 
                                                          
5 Note that this last point will change with the reorganisation of federal-state financial arrangements from 2020 on, 
when the federal level will be allowed to help municipalities financially, at least to some extent (Renzsch, 2017, 769). 
6 Local governments ‘fulfil tasks either by own competences of self-government―some of them being obligatory and 
others optional―or by competences delegated by the Land government’ (Benz and Zimmer, 2011, 160-161). 
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For example, we expect that the policy field ‘Development, Defence, Foreign, Security’ will be 
exclusively covered by national coalition agreements because this policy domain lies in the realm 
of federal jurisdiction (Article 73 (1) German Basis Law), which is also the case for the policy 
domain ‘Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate’. Regarding European issues, however, we 
would expect that also state government parties address some European issues in their coalition 
agreements because, for instance, regional governments and their administrations are part of the 
formulation and implementation of EU regional policies (see e.g. Leonardi, 2005). We expect the 
policy domains of ‘Economy’, ‘Infrastructure, Transportation, Digitization’, ‘Fiscal’ and ‘Justice’ 
to be all-embracing policy fields in the German multi-level governance system because all three 
political levels are either in charge of regulating individual subsections of the respective policy 
domains (for example via taxes and fees, or by attracting companies) or, in the case of ‘Justice’, the 
state structure already determines that all three political levels have a say. Furthermore, the federal 
system of Germany grants the federal states far-reaching responsibilities in education policies. Yet, 
we also expect parties at the federal level to cover education policies in their coalition agreements 
because the federal level, for instance, is responsible for the core financing of higher education 
institutions. Additionally, we expect national coalition agreements (and partially regional coalition 
agreements) to cover welfare, family and health issues the most because particularly the federal 
level is mainly responsible for social-state precautions. Lastly, we mainly expect national coalition 
agreements to cover the policy domain ’Domestic, Asylum, Immigration’ because it is the federal 
level which is legally in charge of the rule of law and immigration policies. However, since this 
policy domain also covers policing (which the Länder are responsible for) and asylum policies 
(which partially the municipalities have to deliver), we also expect this policy domain to be covered 
in coalition agreements at the state and local level, respectively. 
 
14 
Table 1: Theoretical expectations on topic coverage in German coalition agreements7 
Policy domain Federal level State level Local level 
Europe Y (Y) N 
Development, Defence, Foreign, Security Y N N 
Domestic, Asylum, Immigration Y (Y) (Y) 
Economy Y Y Y 
Education (Y) Y N 
Infrastructure, Transportation, Digitization Y Y Y 
Fiscal Y Y Y 
Welfare, Family, Health Y (Y) N 
Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate Y N N 
Justice Y Y Y 
Note: Y = Yes, indicating that a policy domain should be prominently covered in coalition agreements at the respective 
political level; (Y) = (Yes), indicating that a policy domain might be covered to a certain extent in coalition agreements 
at the respective political level; N = No, indicating that a policy domain should only be marginally covered in coalition 
agreements at the respective political level. 
 
 
4. Data and Measurement 
 
Which topics do parties cover in their coalition agreements? To answer this question, we rely on 
data from the German multi-level government system. Germany ranks low both on ‘institutional 
clarity’ and ‘government clarity’ compared to other European states (Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 
2013) due to its multi-level political system where each level of government has its specific rights 
but where there is also joint decision-making and mutual interrelations regarding execution 
                                                          
7 We acknowledge the fact that the allocation of responsibilities is not always as clear cut as this typology might suggest. 
Due to the highly complex nature of the German multi-level system, we, however, try to simplify this by relying on 
broad categories.  
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competences across the three different political levels. Furthermore, coalition agreements prevail 
on all political levels in Germany. Nearly all federal- and state-level governments draft a coalition 
agreement (see e.g. Kropp, 2002; Kropp and Sturm 1998) and if parties decide to form a coalition 
at the local level, they most often also sign a written statement on their future cooperation (see 
Gross, 2016, 2018). Additionally, most federal, state and local governments (in large cities) are 
minimal winning coalitions (Debus and Gross, 2016; Debus and Müller, 2013), thus making 
coalition agreements comparable across the different political levels. Local coalition agreements 
closely resemble coalition agreements at the federal and state level since parties include coalition-
internal dispute resolution mechanisms, talk about the allocation of portfolios (such as department 
heads) and focus on highlighting planned policy actions, which leads to the same patterns of policy 
position-variations between different local coalition agreements as at the state and the federal level 
in Germany (see Gross 2016, 187-188; Gross, 2017, 214).8  
 
We use coalition agreements from 1990 to 2017 at the national level (8), at the regional level (81) 
and at the local level (101), i.e. cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.9 Hence, the data set 
comprises in total 190 coalition agreements. National and regional coalition agreements are 
obtained from the Political Documents Archive (Benoit, Bräuninger and Debus, 2009; Gross and 
Debus, 2018b). Data on local coalition agreements comes from the Local Manifesto Project (LMP) 
(Gross and Jankowski, forthcoming). 
 
                                                          
8 Note that the institutional setting at the German local level with a directly elected mayor and a local council is a 
neither a pure presidential nor a pure parliamentarian system (Bäck, 2005; Egner 2015) but rather a ‘mixed democracy’ 
(Gross and Debus, 2018a) or ‘institutional hybrid’ (Egner, 2015) between a ‘quasi-presidential’ (Benz and Zimmer, 
2011; Egner and Stoiber, 2008) or a ‘semi-presidential’ (Debus and Gross, 2016; Bäck, 2005) government system, 
depending on which German state authors are primarily basing their analysis on. This does not change, however, the 
equivalence of local coalition agreements to coalition agreements at the federal and state level because local 
government parties can still shape policy-making and portfolio allocation at the local level, even if the directly elected 
mayor is from an opposing party. 
9 For a detailed justification why cities in Germany with at least 100,000 inhabitants are ‘parliaments in disguise’ and 
why parties frequently form coalitions see Egner (2015) and Gross (2018). Note that coalition agreements at the local 
level were not always publicly available, thus we might be slightly underestimating the number of coalition agreements 
at the local level. 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the coalition agreements at the different levels. The data 
shows that there is significant variation regarding the length of coalition agreements at the national, 
the regional, and the local level. For instance, the shortest coalition agreement at the national level 
is 10,379 words in length while the shortest one at the local level contains only 275 words. Overall, 
the longest coalition agreements are those at the national level, followed by the ones at the regional 
and the local level. 
 
We are interested in how salient certain topics are in the coalition agreements. We chose the 
following ten prominent policy areas: (1) Europe, (2) Economy, (3) Infrastructure, Transportation, 
Digitization (ITD), (4) Fiscal, (5) Education, (6) Domestic, Asylum, Immigration (DAI), (7) 
Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate (AEEC), (8) Welfare, Family, Health (WFH), (9) 
Justice, and (10) Development, Defence, Foreign, Security (DDFS). The ten policy areas are not 
one-to-one aligned to ministries at the federal and state level (Pappi and Seher, 2009) or to 
departments at the local level because the denomination and composition of ministries is 
dependent on government composition and the policy preferences by government parties. Hence, 
the policy areas chosen for the analysis are broader than the classification of ministries and 
departments, not least because government parties at the federal and state level in the last years 
decided to combine policy domains in ministries that are not as closely aligned as in former times 
(see Pappi and Seher, 2009). 
 
Table 2: Number of words in German coalition agreements 
Level Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. N 
National level 10,379 61,922 35,517 21,349 8 
Regional level 4,310 60,972 24,913 13,970 81 
Local level 275 22,689 5,771 4,746 101 
Note: Total number of words in German coalition agreements at the national, regional, and local level (1990-2017). 
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To be more specific, we are interested in the share of attention that is being attributed to the ten 
policy areas in the various coalition agreements. In order to obtain the shares, we rely on the 
dictionary coding approach (see e.g. Laver and Garry, 2000). Dictionary coding is a quantitative 
approach for analysing a large amount of texts. In contrast to qualitative approaches, quantitative 
approaches make use of ‘mechanical criteria’ (Laver and Garry, 2000, 625) to group words or text 
units into pre-defined categories. In the case of dictionary coding, words or specific phrases that 
pertain to certain policy or issue areas are allocated to these categories. This dictionary is then 
applied to the texts and looks for the frequency of occurrence of the words and categories in these 
texts (Laver and Garry, 2000). For this paper, we developed a dictionary that includes words 
pertaining to the individual policy categories in the coalition agreements (see Table 4 in the 
Appendix for a list of key words). 
 
Constructing a dictionary does not come without problems. It is necessary to identify and include 
key terms that adequately describe the content of the categories. At the same time, these key terms 
should exclusively apply to just one category. We relied on a procedure suggested by Laver and 
Garry (2000) to construct the dictionary: a combination of a priori and empirical criteria. A priori, 
we allocated words to our categories by relying on empirical examples from Jakobs and Jun (2018), 
Pappi and Seher (2009) and Bergmann et al. (n.d.). Jakobs and Jun (2018) divided German parties’ 
manifestos to the general elections in 2017 and the respective coalition agreement in several policy 
(and non-policy) domains and assigned specific segments of text to these domains. We took their 
identified policy domains as a starting point for our analysis, but we re-arranged some of the policy 
areas to better fit the names of ministries and departments at the federal, state and local level. Next, 
we partly followed the procedure of Pappi and Seher (2009) who start their classification of policy 
domains by using the names of German ministries at the state level and the ’joint occurrence of 
domains in the name of ministries’ (Pappi and Seher, 2009, 409) to develop a categorical scheme 
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of policy areas covered in party manifestos.10 Subsequently, they assigned the party manifestos’ 
subtitles to specific policy domains. We, too, added words to the dictionary by reading through 
randomly chosen coalition agreements and identifying terms that appeared in most subtitles within 
the coalition agreements by backing up the assertion of Pappi and Seher (2009, 410) that parties 
use (sub-)sections in manifestos—and coalition agreements—to signal to voters what the most 
important policy domains are. Following Bergmann et al. (n.d.), who fit structural topic models to 
parliamentary speeches in the German Bundestag to unravel the policy area a parliamentary debate 
was mainly about, we used their list of frequent and exclusive words for each policy domain and 
subsequently skimmed through a random selection of documents to add words to some categories 
in order to get a more balanced number of words between different policy areas. In the end, the 
construction of our dictionary was an iterative process, in which we started off with a basic 
dictionary, ran the analysis and then checked for inconsistencies. We then added missing words 
and deleted or re-allocated others. 
 
Applying dictionary coding to coalition agreements provides one with the frequency with which 
the words belonging to a specific policy area in the dictionary are mentioned in the coalition 
agreement. We present the share of these frequencies, meaning that we summed up all mentions 
and then divided the frequencies of each policy category by the total number of mentions. Hence, 
we end up with a share of each policy category in our dictionary. 
 
 
5. Empirical Analysis and discussion of results 
 
                                                          
10 Note that Pappi and Seher (2009) explicitly are interested in party manifestos’ ‘coalition-relevant content’ because 
of the ‘policy domain-specific policy signals’ to ‘potential coalition partners’ (Pappi and Seher, 2009, 408), thus coming 
close to our intention in this article to study policy-relevant topics in coalition agreements. 
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The results of our dictionary analysis are presented in Figure 1.11 The red bars show the shares for 
the coalition agreements at the federal level, the green bars represent the shares for the coalition 
agreements at the state level, and the blue bars are the shares for the coalition agreements at the 
local level. It is important to note that the results must not be interpreted in the sense that low 
values indicate that government parties do not care about such policy domains; rather, the results 
demonstrate the ratio between different policy domains, i.e. where government parties’ focus is 
placed on in coalition agreements. Overall, the graph shows that there is not only variation in 
salience between the different levels within the multi-level governance system of Germany but also 
between the different policy domains. We first turn to each political level separately before we take 
a closer look at the comparison between the different political levels and policy domains. 
 
Coalition agreements at the federal level in Germany primarily focus on the policy domains 
‘Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate’ (19 %), ‘Welfare, Family, Health’ (16 %) and 
‘Economy’ (15 %). These latter two policy domains are policy areas where the federal level has 
rather strong legislative decision-making authorities and financial responsibilities vis-à-vis the sub-
national levels, whereas the category ‘Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate’ is largely 
regulated at the EU-level. Regarding the latter fact it makes sense that national government parties 
talk a lot about these supranational issues because, first, that is where the money mainly comes 
from to support farmers, and, second, problems and challenges within this policy domain are 
predominantly dealt with at supranational summits and conferences. Note, however, that this 
seems not to be the case in two policy areas where exclusive legislative competences lie at the 
national level: ‘Europe’ and ‘Development, Defence, Foreign, Security’. Although the results are 
in line with our theoretical expectation that the salience for both categories is substantially higher 
at the federal than at the sub-national level, both topics do not play a dominant role in national 
                                                          
11 The results were obtained after we cleaned and set up our text corpus with the ‘tm’ R-package (Feinerer and Hornik, 
2018) and ran the dictionary analysis with the ‘quanteda’ R-package (Benoit et al., 2018). 
20 
coalition agreements in Germany (compared to other policy domains; see also Jakobs and Jun, 
2018, for the current coalition agreement). 
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Figure 1: Share of policy fields in German coalition agreements 
 
Note: The figure presents the share of ten policy areas in German coalition agreements at the local, regional, and national level (1990-2017). Note that the basis for comparison of the 
shares is the sum of the ten policy areas. 
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The descriptive analysis for the German Länder level clearly shows that state government parties 
also mostly focus on ‘Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate’, ‘Economy’ and ‘Welfare, 
Family, Health’, but also on ‘Education’ and ‘Infrastructure, Transportation, Digitization’, i.e. 
policy areas they are either solely responsible for (education) or where there exists a large degree 
of joint decision-making authority with the federal level. Hence, and highlighting the state-federal 
nexus in Germany, regional politicians use coalition agreements to signal their policy preferences 
to voters and politicians at the federal level regarding those policy areas where regional 
governments must be involved via the Bundesrat due to the regulations of the German Basic Law. 
Furthermore, since state-level parties in Germany already position themselves in their regional 
election manifestos regarding the EU’s regional policy (Gross and Debus, 2018), it is hardly 
surprising that they also address EU-dominated policy domains once they are in government. It is 
the regional level which exceedingly benefits from the EU’s regional policy and EU’s common 
agricultural policy, and, therefore, regional government parties have an incentive to address welfare 
and agricultural issues in their coalition agreements because particularly EU Cohesion policy has 
an impact on the economic development of regions, even in a rich country such as Germany (for 
an overview see Crescenzi and Giua, 2017).  
 
Yet, the most prominent example of (more or less) exclusive legislative competences at the state 
level is ‘Education’. Partly contrary to expectations solely based on the legal jurisdiction of this 
policy field, the salience for education is highest at the local level, followed by the state level, while 
it is lowest at the federal level. The high salience at the local level, however, can partly be explained 
by the fact that the local level is usually responsible for the implementation of the legislative acts 
that were enacted at the regional level. More importantly, however, it is the responsibility of local 
municipalities and their administrations to refurbish schools and kindergartens which is one of the 
most fiercely discussed topics in German local politics. The same applies for the policy fields of 
‘Infrastructure, Transportation, Digitization’, ‘Fiscal’ and ‘Economy’ when it comes to the 
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improvement of (local) public transport, broadband expansion and attracting companies to locate 
in specific areas. Lastly, local politicians also devote a considerable amount of space to ‘Agriculture, 
Environment, Energy, Climate’. From a strictly legal perspective, this is surprising because the 
local level does not have any say in these policy fields. Yet, particularly this policy domain 
demonstrates that political actors do not only care about the legal competences they have when 
writing a coalition agreement but also about topics that are salient for their partisan supporters or 
the electorate in general. For example, the discussions about air pollution, nitrogen-reduction 
measures and ‘no drive’ zones in German cities are highly disputed in the last years. Although the 
local political level does not have a final say in legislative decision-making in the aforementioned 
policy fields, local interests are directly affected. Hence, we would argue that voters expect from 
local politicians to address these important issues in local coalition agreements. 
 
Considering all three political levels, the closest resemblance between coalition agreements at the 
federal, state and local level can be seen in the policy domain ‘Economy’. Economy is almost 
equally important for government parties at the national, regional and local level, at least based on 
the share of attention they devote to this issue in their coalition agreements. Since there are no 
exclusive legislative competences with regard to economy, the results are in line with our 
theoretical expectations. Furthermore, since sub-national political actors are also (partly) evaluated 
by voters for their perceived state of the regional economy and because ‘[b]oth federal and regional 
governments have a role to play in shaping economic conditions in their jurisdictions’ (Toubeau 
and Wagner, 2018, 22-23), sub-national political actors have clear incentives to address economic 
issues in coalition agreements. Table 3 includes an overview of our results. Bold letters signal that 
our theoretical expectations are supported by the results. Overall, we find (tentative) support for 
our three general hypotheses. 
 
Table 3: Evaluation of the theoretical expectations on topic coverage in German coalition 
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agreements 
Policy domain Federal level State level Local level 
Europe Y (Y) N 
Development, Defence, Foreign, Security Y N N 
Domestic, Asylum, Immigration Y (Y) (Y) 
Economy Y Y Y 
Education (Y) Y N 
Infrastructure, Transportation, Digitization Y Y Y 
Fiscal Y Y Y 
Welfare, Family, Health Y (Y) N 
Agriculture, Environment, Energy, Climate Y N N 
Justice Y Y Y 
Note: Y = Yes, indicating that a policy domain should be prominently covered in coalition agreements at the respective 
political level; (Y) = (Yes), indicating that a policy domain might be covered to a certain extent in coalition agreements 
at the respective political level; N = No, indicating that a policy domain should only be marginally covered in coalition 









Coalition agreements play a vital role in coalition governance at the national, regional and local 
level in West and East European democracies. We have analysed the distribution of attention 
towards specific topics and policy domains, respectively, in coalition agreements at the national, 
regional and local level in the German multi-level governance system. We have theoretically 
expected that the emphasis coalition parties put on different topics, should partly depend on the 
legislative competences of the respective governance levels. An opposing argument, however, 
based on insights from multi-level governance research, established the theoretical expectation 
that government parties in multi-level political systems characterized by cooperative federalism 
and joint decision-making should also talk about policy domains that lie beyond their realm of 
legal jurisdiction. 
 
By taking the case of Germany, which is a prime example for cooperative federalism, we analysed 
the content of coalition agreements at the federal, the state and the local level from 1990 to 2017. 
Using a dictionary-based approach, allocating words to ten distinct policy fields, the results show 
that by and large coalition agreements highlight most prominently those policy fields for which 
the respective governing parties are mainly legally responsible for. However, particularly coalition 
agreements at the local level additionally address a range of policy issues where local municipalities 
and their administrations are only indirectly responsible for (from a legal perspective); yet, since 
many problems become most often socially virulent at the local level, it comes as no surprise that 
local governing parties also address these issues in their coalition agreements. Furthermore, in the 
German multi-level system administrative functions are largely transferred to state and local 
administrations, which therefore are de facto in charge of dealing with topics that de jure fall into the 
realm of federal decision-making. 
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Regarding the discussion on ‘dual accountability’, the responsiveness of parties to voters’ needs 
and the ‘clarity of responsibility’ in multi-level systems, these first results indicate that governing 
parties in Germany do not stick to those policy areas they are exclusively responsible for but 
additionally address other policy fields. They might do so for several reasons. For example, they 
might address other policy fields for symbolic reasons (i.e. creating the impression that government 
parties at the state and local level actually can change something at the federal level). Additionally, 
they might also try to influence parties at other political levels. For instance, the regional 
organisation of the SPD, if in government, might try to influence the federal organisation of the 
SPD by mentioning specific topics in their coalition agreement, which might be a challenge for 
intra-party cohesion. Further research should therefore analyse if and how the coalition agreements 
on different levels influence each other but also, for example, party manifestos. Nevertheless, we 
would argue that regional government parties address other policy fields both because of the joint 
decision-making authority structure of the German multi-level governance systems and due to 
sub-national politicians’ willingness to play an active role in legislative decision-making which is 
almost exclusively possible at the federal level via the German Bundesrat. Although regional 
government parties theoretically have the possibility to propose bills in the German Bundesrat, this 
procedure is rather difficult. First, they must compromise with their coalition partner(s) because 
only the government as an entity is able to act in the Bundesrat. Second, they also need to find a 
majority in the Bundesrat for their proposal which is increasingly difficult due to the increasing 
number of different coalition combinations in the Bundesrat. Local politicians can only raise the 
awareness of problems, grievances and (financial) needs at the local level by either publicly 
announcing these topics—and hoping for some media coverage—or by speaking directly to their 
constituents via the content of their coalition agreements, thus signalling that they are pulling all 
the plugs to economically and socially improve local municipalities. 
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The German multi-level political system is a prime example of joint decision-making authorities 
and mutual interrelations within cooperative federalism. Not surprisingly, coalition agreements at 
the national, regional and local level also include topics that are not exclusively lying in the 
respective realm of legislative decision-making. Future studies might want to take a look at political 
systems characterized by dual federalism (e.g. Switzerland, United States of America) or 
asymmetric federalism (e.g. Canada, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom) to investigate to what extent 
intergovernmental arrangements, at least between the national and the state level, might play a role 
in government parties’ addressing of topics in coalition agreements. 
 
Furthermore, individual parties’ strategies, position-taking and issue ownership might also play a 
role for the topic coverage of coalition agreements, as well as the context the coalition agreements 
are written in. Parties most likely will strive for the inclusion of topics that are salient for their 
voters and party members, and they need to react to the political and economic environment they 
are bargaining in. This means that they should also include topics that are of high relevance for 
the public at the time of writing the coalition agreement, even if these topics are not the primary 
concern of the parties. Future research could investigate to what extent these considerations might 
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Table 4: Dictionary 
Europe maastricht*, lissabon*, ezb, euro*, eu, rettungsschirm*, emf, 
binnenmarkt*, euroraum*, mitgliedsstaa*, wirtschaftsunion*, 
waehrungsunion*, eu-*, schengen*, *erweiterung 
Development, Defence, 
Foreign, Security 
kse*, militaer*, bundeswehr*, soldat*, panzer*, waffe*, wehrpflicht*, 
krieg*, weltraum, auslandseinsa*, abruestung*, verteidigung*, friede*, 
wehrdienst*, kasern*, wehrtechnisch*, ruestung*, terror*, nato, 
afghanistan, osz, nationen, russland, menschenrecht, aussenpolitik, 
staaten, menschenrecht*, israel, streitkraeft*, bundesverteidigung* 
Domestic, Asylum, 
Immigration 
rechtsstaat*, polizei*, polizist*, sicherheit*, videoueberwachung*, 
ueberwach*, zuwanderung*, bundesinnen*, *extremismus, 
grundgesetz, staatsangehoerigkeit*,rechtsstaat, verfassungs*, 
schwarzarbeit*, fluechtling*, kriminal*, kriminell*, extremis*, asyl*, 
datensch* 
Economy privatisier*, regionalpolitik*, energiewirtschaft*, deregulier*, 
wirtschaft*, wachstum*, export*, import*, wettbewerb*, 
volkswirtschaft*, weltwirtschaft*, marktwirtschaft*, industrie*, 
gruender*, selbststaendig*, fachkraft*, fachkraeft*, 
vollbeschaeftigung*, unternehme*, kartell*, monopol*, handel*, 
gueter*, mittelstand*, mittelstaend*, handwerk*, innovation*, 
einzelhandel* 
Education bildung*, schule*, hauptschule*, hauptschueler*, schueler*, 
realschule*, realschueler*, gymnasium*, gymnasiast*, grundschule*, 
grundschueler*, ausbildung*, sonderschule*, sonderschueler*, 
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wissenschaft*, forschung, forsche*, universitae*, hochschule*, 
exzellenzinitiativ*, studieren*, student*, studierend*, promotion*, 
bologna*, bachelor*, master*, post- doc*, professor*, professur*, 





logistik*, infrastruktur*, verkehr*, bundesverkehrswegeplan*, 
schienen*, radweg*, landstrasse*, bundesstrasse*, autobahn*, 
verkehrsschild*, geschwindigkeitsbegrenz*, lkw*, pkw*, maut*, 
wegekostengutacht*, vignette*, strasse*, oeffentlich-privat*, oepnv*, 
strassenbau*, laermbelastung*, laermbelaestigung*, 
verkehrsuebertragend*, bundesfernstrasse*, bundesschienenweg*, 
geraeuschminderung*, trasse*, luftverkehr*, schadstoffminderung*, 
bestandsnetz*, streckenertuechtigung*, luftfahrt*, flugrout*, 
fluggesellschaft*, flughafen*, flughaefe*, flugzeug*, bahn*, 
eisenbahn*, bundeswasserstrasse*, hafen*, haefen*, schiff*, nord-
ostsee-kanal*, autogas*, erdgas*, elektromobilitaet*, tankstelle*, 
brennstoffzellentechnologie*, carsharing*, fahrrad*, luftraum*, 
gueterverkehr*, telekommunikation*, internet*, breitband*, wlan* 
Fiscal steuerpol*, erbschaftssteuer*, grundsteuer*, bankenaufsicht*, 
bankenunion*, bund-laender-finanzbeziehung*, landesfinanz*, 
bundesfinanz*, konsolidier*, finanzstark*, finanzschwach*, finanz*, 
landesmittel*, bundesmittel*, solidarpakt*, haushalt*, staatsfinanz*, 
schuldenbremse* 
Welfare, Family, Health  droge*, sucht*, *sucht, grundsich*, erziehung*, familien*, kindertag*, 
kindersch*, kinderrecht*, mehrgeneration*, jugendsch*, eltern*, 
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alleinerziehend*, kinderbetr*, arbeitslosenversicherung*, hartz*, 
rente*, pension*, sozialpolitik*, sozialbudget*, armut*, 
gesundheitsversorgung*, pflege*, patient*, medizinisch*, medizin*, 
kranken*, diagnose*, arzt*, aerzt*, ambulant*, stationaer*, 
psychotherapeut*, praxisnetz*, kassenaerztlich*, 
behandlungstermin*, hausarzt*, hausaerztlich, hausaerzt*, facharzt*, 
fachaerzt*, arznei*, heilmittel*, mehrfachbehinderung*, 
gesundheitsberuf*, klinik*, universitaetsklinik*, apotheke*, 




natur*, solar*, windenergie, windkraft, EEG, bio*, 
gebaeudesanierung, erneuerbar*, energie*, treibhaus*, CO*, 
emission*, klima*, erderwaermung, nachhaltigkeit, umwelt*, 
kohlenstoffdioxid*, umweltverschm*, atom*, radioaktiv*, *gift*, 
kohle*, braunkohle*, endlag*, nuklear*, geotherm*, steinkohle*, 
pflanzenschutzmittel*, verbraucher*, bauern*, landwirt*, agrar*, 
lebensmittel*, fleisch*, tierschutz*, kernenergie* 
Justice  richte*, gericht*, strafma*, bundesgerichtshof*, 
bundesverfassungsgericht*, landesgericht*, strafvollzug*, 
straftaeter*, freiheitsstrafe*, bewaehrungsstrafe*, jugendstraf*, JVA, 
*gericht, *vollzug 
 
